The purpose of this paper is to: i) explore the landscape of risk assessment and the implications of uncertainty, ii) identify tools for the explicit treatment of uncertainty in risk, iii) examine the role and limits of quantitative risk assessment in the context of management decisions.
Introduction
The assessment and management of uncertain risks is an essential component of science, engineering, medicine, business, law and other modern disciplines. I. Good argues that risk science based on the evaluation of probabilistic events has been useful in saving and improving lives throughout history, "since the assessment of uncertainty incorporates the idea of learning from experience which most creatures do" (Good, 1959) . Learning from experience is only part of the challenge, since many decisions involve new or evolving risk scenarios in which humans have little or no experience. Risk management capabilities must include the ability to respond to risks that are known and well understood, and the ability to detect and anticipate those that are newly emerging (e.g., USEPA SAB, 1995; NRC, 1999; USEPA ORD, 2000) . Uncertainty analysis provides a framework for characterizing the position of a problem along this continuum and the implications for appropriate response and management.
Uncertainty about risk arises due to a fundamental lack of understanding about how the world works, randomness in the outcome of natural and human processes, and an inability to measure, characterize or even at times define key quantities of interest that affect, or are affected by, risk.
Risks can vary across time, space, and from individual to individual in a population. Characterization of these variations is an essential part of a risk analysis; however, the basic knowledge or data to fully and effectively characterize risk, and its variability, are often lacking. Uncertainty analysis helps to reveal the nature of this incomplete knowledge and its potential impact on decisions.
In this paper, the essential features of risk and uncertainty are reviewed to identify the role of quantitative assessment in helping to characterize and manage risks. The landscape of risk assessment is reviewed, noting the role that scientific uncertainty plays during the evolution of a risk problem through phases of discovery, increasing awareness, deliberation, management decision and implementation. Probabilistic methods for uncertainty analysis are considered, and the historic growth of their use is documented. The role of probabilistic assessment in informing or guiding risk management decisions is discussed, including alternative risk-based or precautionary approaches for dealing with uncertainty. The role and limits of quantitative assessment of uncertainty are explored by examining three case studies: i) siting and permitting municipal waste combustors; ii) addressing global climate change; and iii) protecting against species extinction.
Background and Definitions
Uncertainty analysis may be qualitative or quantitative. Qualitative descriptions of uncertainty seek to characterize the general state of knowledge about the risk and the overall weight of evidence concerning the nature and source of the hazard. This type of evaluation is routinely carried out early in a risk assessment, during the "hazard assessment" stage (NRC, 1983) . Qualitative assessments may seek to identify alternative scenarios for the risk outcome, the possible implications of these scenarios, their severity and likelihood. Once specific measures of a risk outcome are identified -the likelihood of occurrence of a health endpoint for an individual, population incidence, lives lost, hectares of habitat destroyed, or dollars required for remediation -and methods and models developed to predict these quantities, then quantitative uncertainty analysis can provide insight into the probability of occurrence of different values of these measures. Even then, qualitative evaluation retains an important role in characterizing the fundamental assumptions of the analysis and the state-of-the-science supporting them.
Quantitative uncertainty analysis seeks to identify the relationship between risk model assumptions and inputs and the resulting uncertainty in predictions of risk. In the context of human health risk assessment, uncertainty analysis focuses on models and inputs that estimate exposure, dose, and the resulting health effects. Quantitative analysis may be used to examine the impact of person-to-person variability in factors such as ambient concentrations, timeactivity patterns, ingestion and inhalation rates, susceptibility to disease, body weight or age. It may also consider scientific uncertainty, for example, in the fate and transport of chemicals released to the environment, or in the dose-response relationship.
The need for careful delineation of variability and uncertainty, and proper recognition of the differing roles that these play in a quantitative risk assessment, are now widely recognized (e.g., Bogen, 1990 Bogen, , 1995 Hoffman and Hammonds, 1994; NRC, 1994; Burmaster and Wilson, 1996; Frey and Rhodes, 1996; Cullen and Frey, 1999; Hertwich et al, 1999) . Variability reflects the different levels of risk experienced by individuals, both before and after a mitigating action is taken. Variability reflects true differences between individuals, timeframes, and geographic locations. Uncertainty dictates that the true levels of risk faced by any individual or group are unknown. Uncertainty arises due to a lack of knowledge, the use of models which require inherent simplification of real-world processes and relationships, limits in the feasibility of measurement or other data collection, and the need to project future impacts and consequences which can not be observed at the present time.
While variability and uncertainty are often addressed with the same tools and techniques, they have different impacts on the decision process. "Uncertainty forces decision makers to judge how probable it is that risks will be overestimated or underestimated for every member of the exposed population, whereas variability forces them to cope with the certainty that different individuals will be subjected to risks both above and below any reference point one chooses" (NRC, 1994) . Uncertainty analysis may assist a decision maker in communicating or justifying a decision to the public, the media, a judge or jury, indicating "that the decision made was neither arbitrary nor ill-informed" (Finkel, 1990) . Uncertainty analysis may provide information about the degree of, or lack of, conservatism in single point estimates of risk. It may assist with the prioritization of information gaps for additional study by revealing the relative impact of uncertainty and variability on the decision under consideration.
Sensitivity analysis is an important adjunct of uncertainty analysis, determining the impact of particular model inputs and assumptions on the estimated risk. Sensitivity analysis is often conducted as a precursor to uncertainty analysis, helping to identify those model assumptions or inputs that are important -if the models are not sensitive to a particular input or set of inputs, there is no need to examine these inputs as part of a more sophisticated uncertainty analysis. Sensitivity analysis is revisited in the subsequent phases of an uncertainty analysis to identify those inputs and assumptions that are significant contributors to the overall variance of the output and/or critical to pending decisions (for an example of the latter, see Merz et al., 1992) , thereby identifying the uncertainties that matter. In this manner, priorities can be established for further research and data collection efforts.
Recent History
The introduction of explicit techniques for the treatment of uncertainty in risk assessment in US regulatory policy has occurred over the past 30 years. An early example was the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission sponsored "Reactor Safety Study" (Rasmussen et al., 1975) which together with reviews and follow-up studies led the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to develop probabilistic safety objectives to supplement qualitative safety goals already in place. In the Reactor Safety Study, event trees were developed which systematically laid out scenarios with the potential to lead to reactor accidents. Probabilities were assigned to these scenarios using a combination of quantitative information found in industrial records and expert judgment. The Study's reliance on subjective information elicited from experts led to criticism. In retrospect, the reliance on judgment was found to be generally sound and largely unavoidable, however in its implementation it resulted in "greatly understated uncertainty bands" (Lewis et al., 1979) The last several decades have brought major advances in probabilistic risk assessment in civil engineering for building codes, and in aeronautical/astronautical and electrical engineering for ensuring the reliability of systems and circuits. These techniques have been used to identify weak points and opportunities for systems improvement. Still, many engineers (and their lawyers) remain uncomfortable explicitly computing the probability that their design will fail, thereby acknowledging that such a possibility is an inherent part of the design. It is expected that some time will be required to overcome this aversion, and the associated history of ignoring or avoiding explicit statements of uncertainty in the design, siting, permitting and operation of both industrial and public sector facilities (Morgan and Henrion, 1990; Lave et al., 1990) .
Policies and practices regarding the treatment of uncertainty in environmental health risk assessment have been evolving for many years in government agencies, academic circles, and industrial fora. The initial guidance of the "Red Book" (NRC, 1983) addressed uncertainty in the risk characterization phase of a health risk assessment, noting the need to respond to the following:
• (NRC, 1996) , several bills proposed by members of Congress, and a set of U.S. EPA memoranda on agency policy on risk assessment, risk characterization, and Monte Carlo analysis (Habicht, 1992; Browner, 1995; USEPA Science Policy Council, 1997b) . Similarly, uses of probabilistic methods for risk assessment have been instituted in other countries (e.g., UK ILGRA, 1996 As these reports and guidance suggest, probabilistic approaches have gradually come to be accepted in recent years, especially for exposure assessment. The most recent US EPA Exposure Factors Handbook (USEPA, 1997a) includes distributions that describe variability in a number of exposure factors across target populations, and information on the uncertainty of these estimates.
The adoption of probabilistic methods has occurred much more slowly in the area of doseresponse assessment. This is so in part because the uncertainties in the overall dose-response assessment are so fundamental that our ability to grapple with them is limited. Even if a chemical has been evaluated using animal studies, the need for extrapolation across doses and species introduces uncertainties not especially amenable to analysis using many of the standard tools of uncertainty analysis. Further uncertainty is introduced in the application of individual chemical toxicity factors, since compounds do not act alone in the environment, but rather together, resulting in exposures to a variety of complex mixtures. Even with good data on actual human exposures -and such datasets are rare -the low signal-to-noise ratios that typify epidemiological studies introduce considerable uncertainty when these data are introduced in practice.
While simpler, consensus or conservative approaches, such as the use of point (e.g., "upper 95% confidence") estimates for dose-response potency factors remain most common in current practice, such approaches leave major and fundamental uncertainties unaddressed. An example resulting from the format of traditional animal studies is the questionable relevance to human exposure of the timing of animal dosing. Despite the presence of great uncertainty many now argue persuasively for explicit uncertainty analysis, based on the finding that dose-response uncertainty is often the largest and most important source of error in an integrated health risk assessment (Bogen, 1990; McKone and Bogen, 1992; Cullen, 1995) 1 . Indeed, the application of detailed, rigorous methods for uncertainty analysis in an exposure assessment, followed by use of point estimates for the dose-response calculation, may rightfully be considered akin to the classic search for lost keys under the lamppost -the key to resolving uncertainty in a risk assessment may not lie where the tools and estimates already exist, but rather where our current knowledge is dimmest.
The Social-Scientific Context of Risk and Uncertainty Analysis
The social and cultural context of a risk, and the associated scientific studies undertaken to characterize it and inform risk management decisions, can greatly influence the way that uncertainty is studied, presented and interpreted (Wynne, 1980; Clarke, 1988; MacKenzie, 1990; Jasanoff, 1993; NRC, 1996; Thompson and Dean, 1996) . Heuristic tendencies towards overconfidence and a systematic underestimation of uncertainty in model predictions by those who develop and apply risk models are well documented (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973; Fischhoff et al., 1982; Henrion and Fischhoff, 1986; Freudenburg, 1988; Morgan and Henrion, 1990; Small and Fischbeck, 1999) . Some assessments may tend to highlight uncertainty, while others downplay it (Jasanoff, 1990; MacKenzie, 1990; NRC, 1996) , especially when considering extreme outcomes (Patt, 1999) . Historic adaptation by decision makers and the public to the systematic underreporting of uncertainty, combined with questions about the motivations and biases of some risk studies, can lead to interpretations of reported uncertainties by targeted audiences that differ considerably from those intended by the scientists reporting them (Wynne, 1987; Slovic, 1993; Shapin, 1994; Peters, et al., 1997; Petts, 1998; Hunt et al., 1999; Word et al., 1999) .
Despite skepticism (albeit healthy) towards highly-confident estimates of risk, we often prefer simple, unambiguous answers from science. In some contexts, a "one-armed scientist" is preferred, 2 especially when creating or maintaining confidence in the decision (even if illusory) is as important as the decision itself (Jasanoff, 1987) . Johnson and Slovic (1995) explore the quandary faced by organizations considering how to communicate their own degree of uncertainty about risk issues that they must manage. Their empirical studies with focus groups indicate that highly confident statements about the problem build public confidence in the competency of the agency, but can lead citizens to question their honesty. Full and open expressions of uncertainty can make the agency appear more honest, but (alas) less competent. The challenge today is to conduct and communicate honest, competent risk and uncertainty analyses, with appropriately structured stakeholder and expert input and deliberation in problem formulation, study and evaluation, so that trust can be built for both the competency and the objectivity of the analysis (Jasanoff, 1993; NRC, 1996) . The evolution of awareness of a risk problem and the perceived uncertainty associated with it often follows a consistent recognizable pattern. Scientific and public awareness, and demands for risk management, undergo predictable growth and amplification through the processes of scientific discovery, information transmission, media coverage, and response to information (Kasperson et al., 1988; Renn et al., 1992; Kasperson and Kasperson, 1996) . Risk awareness and perceived uncertainty often evolve through four major phases, illustrated in Figure 1: 1. Discovery: Here awareness of the risk emerges, then, depending on the magnitude of the problem, press coverage diffuses information to all sectors. The problem may have been present for many years, but previously undetected with available measurement tools, or it may emerge as a result of a new technology, chemical formulation, greatly expanded use of an existing technology or product, or increased public awareness. For example, MTBE, used as a gasoline additive in the US to improve air quality, has been recognized for a number of years to be highly mobile and persistent, and capable of resulting in the widespread contamination of surface and ground waters (Squillace et al., 1996) .
2. Amplification: Here the risk is the subject of growing concern in response to new study results, press releases, incidents or accidents. In the case of MTBE, evidence of, and anger over, widespread water pollution impacts continued to accumulate (Johnson et al., 2000;  What is the role of uncertainty in reflecting, guiding or promoting transitions of risk problems through these various phases? While each problem undergoes its own unique path through discovery, amplification and management, the profile shown in Figure 1 is typical. When the awareness of a risk first emerges, the reported uncertainty is often low, and usually underestimated. This is to be expected; when dealing with surprise our tools for analysis are quite limited (Shylakhter, 1994; Hammitt and Shylakhter, 1999; Casman et al., 1999) . It is difficult to know much at all about an emerging risk, even your current level of uncertainty. During the awareness amplification phase, uncertainty -at least that reported and acknowledged -is amplified as well. This is especially common as new events or new data expose previously unrecognized aspects of the problem. of what is sufficient. Those favoring rapid implementation of (possibly costly) control strategies typically argue that enough is already known; while those favoring delay argue that the uncertainties remain too great and that further study is needed. Those familiar with the decadelong debate over the health and sustainability of salmon populations in the northwest of the United States during the 1990's will recognize these arguments. Only recently was a clear decision and transition to the risk management phase made, with the listing of multiple species under the Endangered Species Act (see section 6.3) without full resolution of many of the attendant uncertainties. As suggested in Figure 1 , once the pressure and high stakes of a decision have passed, perceptions of uncertainty among stakeholders often converge (though usually not completely) to some moderate level, as the risk management program is implemented. Whether this pattern will hold in the case of salmon recovery efforts remains to be seen.
Estimating Uncertain Risk
Given the context in which analyses of risk are embedded it is not surprising that no single approach is uniformly applicable in dealing with variability and uncertainty. Still, it is important to acknowledge all sources of variability and uncertainty about risk, and to justify the selection or omission of each of these sources in subsequent analysis. As outlined below, choosing among the array of approaches from qualitative to quantitative assessments, or from simple bounding to sophisticated numerical analyses, requires analysts to think about the appropriateness of increasingly complex assessments given the decision under consideration and the information at hand.
While one approach to dealing with uncertainty has been to simply ignore it, a qualitative discussion of major data gaps and assumptions and their projected impact on the analysis should be within reach in even the most data poor situation. For cases in which fundamental uncertainty due to a lack of scientific knowledge dominates, a qualitative discussion may be most appropriate. At the next level, explicit evaluations of alternative assumptions or scenarios can be conducted to demonstrate model and decision sensitivity to various assumptions. Simple, quantitative estimates can be generated using analytic approximations (such as first-or second-order uncertainty analysis, based on Taylor series approximations) that consider model sensitivity to, and uncertainty in, model parameters and inputs (see Cox and Baybutt, 1981, and Henrion, 1990 , for discussion of analytical approximation methods for uncertainty analysis). More sophisticated numerical methods such as Monte Carlo analysis, can be used to simulate uncertainty and variability in model inputs and outputs. In addition, a number of new methods and conceptual approaches to probabilistic analysis have been developed, including fuzzy arithmetic, interval analysis, and statistics-or AI (artificial intelligence)-based methods.
In most quantitative risk assessment it makes sense to start simply and to increase the level of complexity of the analysis where justified on the basis of available information, intermediate results, the importance of the pending decision, and time and resource constraints in developing the analysis to support the decision. An iterative progression is recommended, whether one is adhering to a precautionary, screening approach in which a set of qualitative tests will be used to gauge the acceptability of a risk, or one is applying a decision framework into which quantitative information about the risk will be directly input. Specific approaches to uncertainty are discussed as they arise in the following sections. In so doing, this paper provides a general overview of the suite of available methods for risk and uncertainty analysis; further detail and elaboration can be found in a number of papers, texts and reports (Cox and Baybutt, 1981; Finkel, 1990; Morgan and Henrion, 1990; Pate-Cornell, 1996; NCRP, 1996; Thompson and Graham, 1996; Cullen and Frey, 1999) .
Objective and Subjective Information in the Risk Assessment Framework
The body of information identified to support a risk assessment may include empirical data, expert knowledge, judgment, opinions, beliefs, intuition, model results, analogies, or a combination of these. In short, it is likely to contain both objective and subjective elements. It is almost impossible to develop a hierarchy of information for use in risk assessments because what constitutes value is context dependent. Are three data points of extremely high quality, on exactly the right population, species, chemical, averaging time, and location, more or less valuable than 3000 data points taken out of context?
The field of probability theory includes distinct definitions of objective and subjective probability, though many of the same tools are used to represent and manipulate both. Objective probability, sometimes referred to as classical probability, is based on the theoretical outcomes of ideal, mathematically-defined events or random processes. As shown in the early work of Laplace, event probabilities can be derived for such cases from a few basic theorems and axioms for the rules of probability. An understanding of the underlying processes that generate or influence a risk informs an analyst about the expected probabilities of various outcomes. Objective probabilities may also be established empirically by observing the relative frequency with which various outcomes occur in long-run trials. This is the frequentist's approach.
Subjective probability by contrast involves personal judgement, intuition and other subjective factors. While references to subjective probability are relatively recent additions to the published record (Ramsey, 1931; de Finetti, 1937) , the use and understanding of this type of information extends back much further. Indeed the genesis of subjective probability and the rule for treating it are traced to Thomas Bayes, a near contemporary of Laplace in the late 1700's, consequently the subjectivist approach to probability is often referred to as the Bayesian method. Medical diagnosis, or projections of success and failure of a startup business, are examples of probabilistic assessments requiring some degree of subjective judgment. Depending on the nature of these assessments and their use of theory and observed data, the line between objective and subjective information can begin to blur.
The search for a definitive distinction between objective and subjective information has a long history. In a discussion of the characteristics of subjective and objective sources of information and knowledge Cooke (1991) reminds us of the divided line framework proposed by Plato. Plato argues that knowledge is partitioned into four ordered categories. From lowest to highest he calls them eikasia (conjecture), pistis (belief), dianoia (correct reasoning from hypotheses as in mathematics), and episteme (knowledge). He draws a line dividing the lower two, the uncertain, fuzzy and subjective, from the higher two, the rigorous and conclusive, which require scholarly competence. Although admittedly an analyst may find comfort in empirical data or apparently concrete measurements, after honest deliberation many, including Cooke, conclude that a schism of this type is neither useful nor real.
Bayesian methods provide a framework for refining risk estimates by combining multiple sources of information. A full Bayesian approach allows subjective assessments of probability to be informed, or "updated" with observed data, thus allowing a combination of the available subjective knowledge and objective information. For many, this is worrisome in that independent analysts can no longer be assured of arriving at the same conclusion. Still, it is rare that one faces a well-defined risk, with a large, perfectly applicable, high-quality data set. Evans et al., (1994a&b) suggest that the real choice is not whether or not to use judgement in risk analyses, but rather where to draw the boundary of analysis. Some analysts draw a "tight" analytic boundary -answering only those questions informed by direct reference to classical or frequentist concepts of probability, but often leaving questions of relevance or interpretation unanswered. Others draw a looser boundary, including questions of relevance and interpretation in their formal analysis. In doing so they rely on both objective and subjectivist definitions of probability. Such a "loose" analysis is willing to forgo some degree of objectivity for improved relevance.
Screening Analysis: Worst Case, Plausible Upper Bounds, Best Estimates
The first step in many quantitative risk assessments involves screening, an initial assessment of whether a hazard is present or whether a present hazard is of sufficient magnitude to be of concern. It is critical that a potential hazard first be defined clearly and the goals and purposes of the analysis understood. For scenarios of interest a model or set of models is developed which links a possible exposure or natural occurrence or other chance event to some outcome of interest (often an adverse effect). Next it is advisable to gather and examine closely the available information pertaining to the problem. A rough comparison of the quality of the available data and the quality requirements for the results of the analysis up front may help avoid disappointment later. Screening assessments are sometimes quite crude depending on the quality and quantity of available information and the state of the science informing the analysis. A lack of either scientific understanding or of relevant information may lead to reliance on default assumptions and it may be difficult to advance beyond a crude look without additional data collection.
Usually one or several point estimates are generated in a screening assessment. The relevant decision context may suggest a focus on worst-case upper bounds, representative central estimates, more plausible upper bounds, or perhaps several of these to gain a sense of uncertainty or variability based on a range of possible estimates. The results of a screening assessment may prompt one of several courses of action. If a worst case screening analysis indicates low hazard or risk relative to the level of concern in the eyes of the decision maker, steps to mitigate the risk might appear unjustified and no further study may be needed. Conversely, immediate steps to mitigate risk might be prompted by high screening estimates of risk, especially if the costs of mitigation are not too high. High costs of action might constitute cause for additional, more detailed analysis in order to become more convinced that these expenditures are warranted. Often screening begins with a worst case assessment and then moves to increasingly more realistic point estimates as warranted, if the risk is not discounted on the basis of insufficient concern (Pate-Cornell, 1996) .
Beyond the Single Number: Probabilistic Analysis
Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) often refers to the generation of distributions of exposure or risk representing uncertainty or variability or both. This approach attempts to account for information from a range of sources and to account for the quality and relevance of that information. The usefulness of pursuing a probabilistic analysis is affected by a number of factors (Tables 1 and 2 ), though the ability to perform such analysis may be limited by available information. To avoid costs of alternatives, substitutes or remedial activity (when they are higher than analysis costs)
To avert severe consequences of poor or biased estimates
To support decisions about whether to actively reduce exposure or do additional research
To allow more rigorous comparisons of alternatives
To provide a systematic consideration of all sources of variability and uncertainty
To provide a basis for comparison among impacted groups, e.g., for evaluation of equity concerns To prioritize opportunities for additional scientific research and:
identify significant contributors to overall variance in risk allow value of information analysis identify fruitful avenues for future research To acknowledge a profound lack of understanding about the problem and its causative relationships To avoid the cost of analysis (when it is higher than the costs of alternatives, substitutes or remediation)
To acknowledge the results of screening indicating that the likelihood of unacceptable risk or hazard is low
To act immediately to reduce risk when safety is an immediate concern
To acknowledge that probabilities are prohibitively uncertain and/or indeterminate To make explicit that there is little variability or uncertainty in the risk
To acknowledge a lack of desire, interest, guidance or experience on the part of decision makers Assume that a screening analysis has been pursued before launching a more complex analysis. The problem has been defined, the purposes of the analysis are understood, and information has been gathered and scrutinized. A model or set of models is in place to describe the problem.
Here is where screening analysis and PRA diverge. In PRA probabilities are assigned to represent uncertainty (and/or variability) in the model(s) and their inputs. These probabilities are propagated through the model(s) and an output distribution describing the probability of various outcomes is generated (see Figure 2 ).
For illustration assume that the model output depicted in Figure 2 is the probability distribution of various degrees of risk faced by an individual. Some examination of this output can inform a decision about whether to invest more time and analysis in the project. Is the risk at a level of concern? Is the variance of the risk distribution prohibitively large considering the decision context? If proceeding with analysis, one could next assess the most significant contributors to overall variance in the risk distribution. Armed with information about the major contributors to variance it may be helpful to weigh the cost or feasibility of obtaining better information against the consequences of making a decision on the basis of the current information and analytic results. At this point the results may be deemed adequate to inform the decision, or the analysis may be continued iteratively with sequential refinement of model choices and inputs. Value-ofinformation techniques, discussed in more detail below, help to identify the improved knowledge or further data expected to be most useful for informing these subsequent model refinements.
Developing Distributions
A major challenge in applying probabilistic risk assessment techniques is representing variable and uncertain risk models and model inputs, often with probability distributions (Morgan and Henrion, 1990; Taylor, 1993; Evans et al., 1994; Haimes and Lambert, 1994; NCRP, 1996; Cullen and Frey, 1999; Thompson, 1999 , Ferson, 1996 Ferson et al., 2000) . For cases where the model variables derive from known underlying mechanisms, a theoretical basis may be present for selecting a particular distribution type or form. The Central Limit Theorem dictates that variables resulting from the sum of many individual components tend to be normal, while those derived from multiplicative processes approach a lognormal distribution. Purely random processes (for example, rare events occurring independently in time or space) can often be represented by a Poisson process, with an exponential distribution for the time (or distance) between events and a Poisson distribution for the number of events occurring over a given time (or spatial) interval. While such theoretical models can provide a good starting point for selecting candidate distributions, real-world conditions often lead to deviations from theoretical models, and an empirical approach to selecting and fitting the distribution must be adopted. When relevant, high quality data are available for these cases, a variety of model identification and parameter estimation techniques can be utilized (Morgan and Henrion, 1990; Taylor, 1993; Burmaster and Thompson, 1998; Cullen and Frey, 1999) . In the more common case of sparse data, elicitation techniques and related approaches are used to convert judgments into probabilities. In between, a combination of approaches may be pursued. In particular, Bayesian methods allow an elicited probability distribution, or one fit to a particular data set, to be updated using information from another data set (general texts on Bayesian methods include Lee, 1989; Press, 1989; Gelman et al, 1995 ; example applications to risk assessment can be found in Iman and Hora, 1989; Eddy et al., 1990; Taylor et al., 1993, Berry and Stangl, 1996; Wolfson et al., 1996) .
A complete discussion of the myriad approaches to information collection is well beyond the scope this paper; however, the critical role of judgement in supporting risk assessments warrants provision of a set of references to the field of expert elicitation. For most people, expert and lay alike, it is very difficult to convert understandings, beliefs, and intuition into probability distributions. Common heuristic biases that often overlay human judgement, and have been observed in many applications, include (NRC, 1996) :
• A tendency to overestimate probabilities for events commonly encountered or frequently mentioned in work or personal environments ("availability" bias); • A tendency to be overly influenced by speculative or illustrative information presented to initially frame a problem ("anchoring and adjustment");
• A tendency to be overconfident, especially for complex problems with sparse data that may or may not be pertinent to the problem at hand ("overconfidence" and "representativeness"); and • A tendency to ignore data or discount evidence that contradicts strongly held convictions ("disqualification"). Expert elicitation protocols have been developed in an attempt to counteract these heuristics and biases, though some degree of bias or misrepresentation should still be expected in elicited probabilities (Winkler, 1967; Spetzler and Holstein, 1975; Slovic et al., 1979; Morgan et al., 1980; Kahneman et al., 1982 , Merkhofer, 1987 Morgan and Henrion, 1990; Cooke, 1991; Wolfson, 1995; Chaloner, 1996) .
Propagating Variability/Uncertainty through Models
Multiple uncertainties in model inputs and structure must be combined and evaluated to determine the overall uncertainty of model predictions. The tools used most frequently in the risk assessment field for this purpose are based on simulation. With these methods models are evaluated repeatedly, with each run of the model representing a possible outcome. The inputs to the model are simulated by sampling one value from each input distribution, then calculating the corresponding value of the model output. Through many iterations a distribution of the output quantity is generated (Figure 2 ). • Simple random, or -"Monte Carlo" sampling, in which each sample of the model inputs is independent of all others. This method, which may be thought of as "independent sampling with replacement," is relatively easy to characterize in terms of the statistical properties of the resulting sample, but often requires a large sample size to obtain accurate, representative estimates of the model input and output distributions.
• Stratified random sampling, in which the input distributions are divided into strata which are subsampled. Stratified sampling methods allow more accurate characterization of variability and/or uncertainty distributions with smaller sample sizes (this may be especially important when it is difficult to evaluate the model many times due to computational requirements), but it is more difficult to describe the statistical properties of the sample. Available methods include Latin Hypercube sampling (McKay et al., 1979; Iman and Convover, 1982) and Hammersley sampling (Kalagnanam and Diwekar, 1997) .
• Targeted -importance sampling, in which a portion of the model input (and resulting output) space is sampled more often, because this portion is associated with high risk conditions or events, or is more relevant to possible risk management decisions (Morgan and Henrion, 1990) . Before embarking on a simulation exercise it is also necessary to consider the presence of correlations among the model inputs, as these may significantly influence the accuracy or applicability of the output generated (Smith et al., 1992; Haas, 1999) .
Methods for Distinguishing Variability and Uncertainty
PRA may be pursued as a one-dimensional exercise in which uncertainty and variability are combined without regard for their different consequences for a decision, although interpretation is limited as a consequence. Alternatively, either variability or uncertainty may be eliminated from the problem by looking at a series of narrowly defined scenarios in which only a subset of factors is allowed to vary across a range of possibilities. For a full discussion of these possibilities see Cullen and Frey (1999) .
For a full evaluation of the implications of variability and uncertainty, PRA can be carried out as a "2-dimensional" (or n-dimensional) analysis in which the sources of variability and uncertainty are handled separately (and often sequentially), with a resulting output distribution that is a multidimensional surface (Frey, 1992; Hoffman and Hammonds, 1994; Simon, 1999) . A twodimensional approach to Monte Carlo simulation allows for the disaggregation and evaluation of the consequences of variability and uncertainty. It can also provide a framework for exploring the interaction of uncertainty and variability. A risk model may be written as (Bogen and Spear, 1987) :
The estimate of Risk to a population of exposed individuals is a function of both variability in parameters V, which have different values for each member of the population, and uncertainty in parameters U for which there is some lack of information about their true values (Frey, 1992) . All three components of the model, Risk, V and U are shown in bold to emphasize that they are vectors, representing risk across multiple individuals in a target population, with multiple sources of variability and uncertainty.
A risk model with both variable and uncertain components is illustrated in Figure 3 . Frequency distributions are specified for all variable quantities and probability distributions are specified for all uncertain quantities (Cullen and Frey, 1999) . Some model inputs are both uncertain and variable and thus are specified with multiple interacting distributions. A technique such as Latin Hypercube Sampling is then employed to generate two sets of samples: the frequency distribution representing each variable quantity is simulated with a sample size of n, and the probability distribution representing each uncertain quantity is simulated with a sample size of m.
The model is repetitively evaluated for each combination of samples from the variable and uncertain parameters, thereby generating the output surfaces (Frey, 1992; Frey and Rhodes, 1996 ).
An alternative approach to simulation evaluates all uncertain variables in an outer loop, followed by sampling from variable parameters in an inner loop. Each uncertain parameter is assigned a particular value before the variable parameters are simulated (for the given realization of uncertainty). This approach is consistent with variability/uncertainty characterizations based on mixture distributions, in which parametric distributions are used to represent variable quantities, but the values of the parameters for these distributions are uncertain. The sequential, hierarchical model is then specified as
where f 1 is the parametric distribution for the variable quantities V, with parameters θ, while f 2 is the distribution for these parameters, itself parametric with parameters α . The distribution f 2 is simulated in the outer loop to determine θ, then V is simulated in the inner loop from f 1 .
The determination of the distribution f 2 for θ from an observed dataset can be accomplished using classical methods, based on sampling distributions (Brattin et al., 1996) , the likelihood function (Burmaster and Thompson, 1998) , or bootstrap methods (Frey and Burmaster, 1999) . It can also be derived using Bayesian methods, starting with a prior distribution for f 2 , updated as the data for the quantities of interest are considered (e.g., Lee, 1989; Press, 1989; Ashby and Hutton, 1996; Berry and Stangl, 1996; Lockwood et al., 2000) . This approach can also allow for probabilistic weighting and sampling of alternative model structures, i.e., different candidate parametric forms for f 1 (e.g., Wood and Rodriguez-Iturbe, 1975; Iman and Hora, 1989; Draper, 1995; Carrington, 1996 Carrington, , 1997 R=f(V,U) 
Interpreting and Communicating Results
The communication and interpretation of PRA results is eased by graphical display and an understanding of probability. As the analyst and decision maker are usually not the same individual, it is important to accompany results with the full set of assumptions and caveats encompassed in the analysis.
How can PRA results be interpreted to help identify the uncertainties that matter most, and to point the analyst to further study or data collection activities that can be most beneficial in reducing these critical uncertainties? Most often only a relatively small subset of inputs is responsible for a majority of the variance in a model output. Morgan and Henrion (1990) , Cullen and Frey (1999) and others describe the use of summary statistics, visual methods, regression approaches and other sensitivity analysis tools to help find the most important input uncertainties. Broader approaches for risk communication and methods for testing the effectiveness of alternative presentations are discussed in Finkel (1990) , Bostrom et al. (1992) , Morgan et al. (1992) and Fischhoff et al. (1998) .
After identifying model inputs and assumptions that contribute significantly to variance in the output it is necessary to consider how to use this knowledge. Value of information (VOI) techniques are recommended for assessing the importance of the variability and uncertainty contributed by individual inputs to the expected value (or conversely, the "loss") associated with a decision under uncertainty (Raiffa and Schlaifer, 1961; Raiffa, 1968; March and Simon, 1958; DeGroot, 1969; Henrion, 1982 , Evans, 1985 Finkel and Evans, 1987; Taylor et al., 1993; Bartell et al., 2000, Thompson and Evans, 1997) . VOI techniques seek to identify situations in which the cost of reducing uncertainty is outweighed by the expected benefit of the reduction. In short, VOI is helpful in identifying model inputs that are significant because: i) they contribute significantly to variance in the output and ii) they change the relative desirability of the available alternatives in the decision under consideration.
It is instructive to consider the results of probabilistic assessment along with the point estimates that would have been generated under alternative deterministic calculations (for a comparison of methods for generating these, see Burmaster and Thompson, 1997) . While deterministic risk assessments are sometimes criticized for their cascading conservatism since they often combine upper-percentile estimates of exposure and risk factors, such comparison may yield surprising results. There are cases in which conservatism compounds dramatically for estimates of risk constructed from the upper percentiles of input parameters, as well as those in which the effect is less notable (Cullen, 1994) . The degree to which the compounding of conservatism occurs in any specific situation is influenced by the structure of the risk or exposure model and the particulars of the relative contributions to overall variance from the individual inputs. For example, the assignment of upper percentiles to influential inputs will have more impact than the assignment of upper percentiles to other inputs. Finally, it should be stressed that the degree of health conservatism imparted by use of upper-percentile estimates in these cases is in fact unknown.
Sample Results
How are results from analyses of uncertain risk used to gain insight? In Figure 4 we show the results of an analysis of the overall variance in dose (sum of inhalation and ingestion doses) of PCBs to adult females living within three miles of a Superfund site (Cullen and Frey, 1999) .
Two-dimensional PRA is pursued in order to explore the relative significance of uncertainty and variability, as well as implications for decision makers. Figure 4 presents the percentiles of variability, with their associated uncertainties depicted as cumulative distribution functions. Figure 4 indicates that variability, represented by the degree of spread across the 2.5th, 50th, and 97.5th percentiles, is greater in magnitude than uncertainty about any of those percentiles, represented by the range covered by any single line of plotted points. Note that on both an absolute and a relative basis, uncertainty increases at the upper percentiles, a result of our decreasing ability to predict exposure as we move out into the upper tails of variability, i.e., for highly exposed individuals. Uncertainty is therefore greater at the upper tail of the variability distribution where the greatest risk management concern is usually focused. . For the case shown in Figure 4 , variability and uncertainty are explored for a randomly chosen individual in the population. Variability is found to contribute more significantly than uncertainty to overall variance. This conclusion rests on the assumption that the models for human intake via ingestion and inhalation are correct and appropriately applied, and that the measurements of PCB concentration from the site are representative of actual exposures. If the decision endpoint is defined in terms of the entire population (e.g., a decision based on population risk or incidence 3 ), then the variability across individuals is integrated out, leaving just uncertainty. In other work, probabilistic sensitivity analysis revealed that for the exposure scenario considered (and assuming a decision focus on individual risk), variability plays a greater role than uncertainty (Cullen and Frey, 1999) . For this case, the uncertainty that was present was found to result primarily from random sampling error in the selection of members of the population to include in the study, with much smaller contributions from dose measurement errors.
These results provide a starting point for thinking about subsequent analyses and the value of collecting additional information. For example, resources directed toward reducing random sampling error by increasing sample sizes would alter the results more than would improving measurement techniques through reduced measurement error. On the other hand, variability, the irreducible component, is the most significant contributor to the overall variance in dose. Specific next steps would depend on the decision(s) being supported by the analysis, for example, whether to target exposure-reduction management strategies to the population as a whole, or to highly-exposed segments of the target population. The greater magnitude of variability (as compared to uncertainty) in this analysis suggests that efforts to identify the morehighly exposed segments of the target population could, at this stage, be more productive than further efforts to reduce the overall uncertainty in the assessment.
New Approaches to Uncertainty Analysis
A number of new approaches for characterizing the uncertainty in risk estimates have emerged in recent years. Notable among these include methods based on fuzzy sets, and classification techniques using a combination of artificial intelligence (AI)/machine learning and statistical methods.
Fuzzy sets arise in two distinct contexts (Klir and Folger, 1988) . The first occurs when we wish to classify a condition that is inherently vague and ambiguous; such as "good" water quality, a "healthy" ecosystem or a "low" (or perhaps even an "acceptable") risk. When mapping from observed or modeled variables (water quality concentrations, species diversity or abundance measures, individual or population risks), there are fuzzy boundaries between good (or healthy, or low) and other classifications that might be assigned, such as "fair", "poor", or "high". Membership in any one of these fuzzy sets can be expressed as a measure (between zero and one, summing to one across all possible sets) that is a function of the observed or modeled 'hard' variables. The spread and degree of overlap in the membership functions reflect uncertainty in our scientific understanding, as well as differences between individuals (expert and lay alike) in what constitutes a good, fair or poor condition. Used in this manner, fuzzy sets can help to bridge the gap between the quantitative output of a risk assessment and the more qualitative, judgmental features of a problem that are often used to summarize and value its outcome.
The second major context in which fuzzy sets arise occurs when the sets themselves are "crisp" (i.e., like the hard outputs or measures of an exposure or risk model), but uncertainty in membership is expressed by a fuzzy measure that reflects "plausibility" or "possibility". In this context, fuzzy sets are more controversial, competing with the more traditional methods of probability, with a number of similar concepts, but a different set of rules and calculus (see for example, http://www.amstat.org/sections/spes/jsm1997%5Finvited5.html). Fuzzy set models of either type have been shown to provide practical insights and effective operational tools in a number of technical domains, including medical diagnosis (Adlassnig, 1986) , transportation (Nakatsuyam et al., 1984; Larkin, 1985) , meteorology (Cao and Chen, 1983) , ecosystem assessment (Giering and Kandel, 1983) , and stakeholder preferences for alternative sitecleanup outcomes (Apostolakis and Pickett, 1998) . More in-depth discussion of specific applications of fuzzy methods in risk analysis is provided in a companion paper in this volume (Haimes, et al., 2001) , and its role in supplementing the more-established procedures of probabilistic risk assessment continues to evolve.
New methods in AI, data-mining and machine learning also provide a potentially rich set of tools for exploring and characterizing uncertainty in risk relationships and models. These tools can be used for initial exploration of complex datasets or for summary evaluation of risk model results. Rule-based expert systems and neural networks are examples of the methods that can be used for evaluations of this type (e.g., Julien et. al., 1992; Song and Hopke, 1996; Brasquet et al., 1999) . A particularly useful tool that allows expert, probabilistic assessments to be updated with observed evidence is the Bayesian Belief Network (BBN). The BBN is a graphical causative network, or influence diagram, that defines the conditional probability relationships among a set of events (Pearl, 1988; Charniak, 1991) . Bayes rule is used to propagate the effect of new information forward and backward through the network, updating the probability of each node. Stiber et al. (1999) demonstrate use of BBN's for evaluating evidence in determining whether or not natural attenuation (versus active remediation) is a viable alternative for a site cleanup. They elicited models from 22 experts relating different chemical and environmental measurements that can be taken at a site to infer whether or not natural attenuation (in particular, reductive dechlorination of trichloroethene) can or is occurring. The analysis revealed different beliefs and assumptions among experts about key biochemical processes and the value of different measurements. This helps to provide insights on the current state-of-the-science and needs for further research. This type of evaluation is useful in exploring broader structural uncertainties in risk models, when causative relationships are still unclear. Druzdzel and colleagues provide a number of citations on BBN's (see http://www.pitt.edu/~druzdzel/publ.html), including available software. Further information on BBN software is available from Norsys (1998) and at
• http://www.hugin.dk/ • http://http.cs.berkeley.edu/~murphyk/Bayes/bnsoft.html .
Frameworks for Decisions About Uncertain Risk
Risk assessment provides a structure for systematically exploring risks, but not necessarily the tradeoffs associated with decisions about risks. The latter is the domain of risk management and risk-based decision making. The management of tradeoffs between competing risks may often rely on risk assessment as a source of information, but, more often than not, within a decision framework that incorporates other factors as well.
In decision making generally it is necessary to gauge the acceptability of, or relative preference for, multiple alternatives. Environmental health regulatory decisions are sometimes considered as falling into multiple categories, for example, those determined on a strict health basis, those determined by technological feasibility and those requiring the balancing of health and other considerations (Lave, 1978) . The exclusive health basis for prioritizing risks, admitting no other considerations, has become rare. Examples included the historic Delaney clause ban (now overturned) on the use of any food additive known to be carcinogenic no matter how low the associated risk (NAS, 1987; Kammen and Hassenzahl, 1999) and statutory mandates for setting ambient particulate matter (PM) standards under the Clean Air Act. The standards for hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) under the 1990 CAA Amendments serve as examples of the application of a technology basis.
A balancing basis in which health risks are considered along with cost of protection, technological and political feasibility, risks of other alternatives, and social and cultural values is increasingly common. Many statutes, including the 1969 US National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), explicitly call for environmental impact statements that explore the full range of projected effects of proposed measures, including health, environmental, economic and social impacts. Precautionary approaches, discussed further below, in practice may also provide a basis for protecting public health within a broader context of selective balancing.
Balancing
Risks may be described quantitatively, but they are invariably interpreted according to our values, and acted on (or not) in the context of legal requirements, practical constraints and other factors. Consider for a moment a set of decision makers, public or private, individuals, groups or representatives. They may pursue a process that includes iterative stages of problem framing, deliberation, data collection, analysis, preliminary decision, final decision, implementation, and ongoing monitoring of the effects and implications of decisions (NRC, 1996) . When these decisions involve risk, they ultimately integrate science and values to decide, given practical constraints, about appropriate tolerance of risk and/or what constitutes acceptable levels of safety and protection (Pate, 1983) .
In most cases individual and social tolerance of a risk depend upon both its quantitative and qualitative characteristics (see Table 3 ). These characteristics have been explored in the literature on the perception of risk, decision analysis, and, more recently, on the adoption of precautionary approaches (Slovic, Fischoff and Lichtenstein, 1979; Lave, 1978; Raffensperger and Tickner, 1999) . These are deliberately introduced and acknowledged at this point for two reasons. First, approaches to assessing risk are out of context without an awareness of the many factors that influence the acceptability of risk in a management decision. Furthermore, the acceptability of a risk-based decision is affected by the decision process as well, such as whether fair and equitable stakeholder participation and informed-consent have been achieved (Pate, 1983; NRC, 1996; CRAM, 1997) . More recently, the precautionary principle has been suggested as an approach that can address some of the limitations of risk assessment. Since risk management must consider characteristics such as those outlined in Table 3 , well beyond those embodied in a traditional risk assessment, a precautionary approach to risk management may defacto allow such considerations to gain standing as factors in the decision. Lave, 1978; Slovic et al., 1979; Pate, 1983; NRC, 1996; CRAM, 1997; Raffensperger and Tickner, 1999) 
Precaution
Recent press comparing and contrasting risk assessment frameworks with the precautionary principle warrants a brief treatment of the topic here. Many of those promoting use of the precautionary principle have done so viewing it as an alternative to risk assessment (Andrews, 1997) . The precautionary principle suggests that when an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some of the cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically. This principle has been summarized as "better safe than sorry" and "a stitch in time, saves nine." First employed in the late 1970s as vorsorge (German for foresight), the precautionary principle has a wide following in Europe and increasingly has garnered attention in the US. In its most pure application the precautionary principle does not call for a balancing of risk with cost or other factors, but rather full avoidance of an unknown risk. In practice, given the reality of risk-risk and risk-cost tradeoffs in any choice among alternatives, it is often applied along with consideration of costs and other factors. For example, in the UK and Sweden an approach referred to as "prudent avoidance" of risks has been adopted (Raffensperger and Tickner, 1999) . Because the precautionary principle does not give explicit guidance as to what constitutes adequate proof of safety, its application may require an exploration of the appropriate balance between resources devoted to establishing causation and resources devoted to reducing a risk.
Risk assessment may be thought of as promoting a fragmented approach to environmental decision making. It applies a sometimes constraining framework to a range of rich and complex questions, often simplifying diverse impacts in a manner that appears to be unreasonable to some. Assuming risk assessment and risk management are kept completely separate, then it would seem that one's adherence to the precautionary principle might only impact risk management. Still, considering the four steps in the risk assessment framework it may be argued that there is a place for precautionary thinking at every step, especially during the initial hazard identification. In this case the precautionary principle acts as an overall guiding philosophy. Its adoption colors choices about which problems to tackle, which assumptions and interpretations are made along the way and finally which conclusions are drawn.
A precautionary approach, based on sound scientific practice and analysis, need not be incompatible with a risk-based (or, perhaps preferably, a "risk-informed" 4 ) decision framework, but in both the need to identify hazards and prioritize them remains unsolved. Tickner (1999) discusses issues that could assist in structuring a precautionary decision making framework, acknowledging that there are necessary steps remaining for determinations of harm and acceptability under uncertainty. These elements encompass a range of challenges in adopting precaution as well as benefits, including this subset from Gee (1997):
• "Who/what gets the benefit of scientific doubt and who has the burden of proof?
• What level of proof is appropriate?
• What other benefits of risk reduction exist?
• How should efforts to reduce risk be balanced with efforts to understand it better?
• What is the likely size and distribution of false negatives and false positives?
• What is the optimum mix of policy instruments, targets, and timetables that will maximize overall cost-effective public policy?"
• How should innovation and risk be balanced?
The precautionary principle has been suggested for guiding decisions about new developments, new activities and new industries, assuming a "safe" status quo of 'no action'. With newly proposed activities momentum may be relatively low since stakeholders may not be fully vested in the benefits of going ahead. Nevertheless, action to restrict or prohibit ongoing risky activities often carries economic consequences and risk, which ultimately may lead to decrements in personal and environmental health. These tradeoffs are not faced without a full comparison of all alternatives, whether they are existing or newly proposed. The principle as strictly applied seems to overlook the importance of comparing the risk of new developments against alternatives.
In cases where the precautionary principle is to be used to support action in advance of scientific evidence of harm, the question remains (as it does within the risk-based decision framework), who decides when the risk of harm is too high to accept? This question is analogous to that faced in all risk management, for example in the process of selecting a "margin of exposure" or a "bright line" for cancer risk decision making. The answer can not be determined independently of the risk of the alternatives. Still, by sharpening the focus on costs and benefits of all alternatives (including no action), the precautionary principle could bring about a better analysis and discussion of available options, including some currently left unconsidered.
The Role and Limits of Quantitative Assessment -Three Examples
The previous sections describe basic tools for assessing uncertain risk and suggest extensions to specialized approaches where warranted. There is no shortage of examples of the application of quantitative tools to assessing uncertain risk, but in the real world virtually all decisions are made on the basis of multiple criteria of which a quantitative risk estimate is but one. The three cases discussed below illustrate the role and limits of quantitative assessment of risk in real decisions. The examples include waste combustor permitting and siting, climate change assessment, and the listing of endangered species. These examples are deliberately drawn from diverse decision contexts and scales of impact. All three grapple with inadequate information drawn from a range of sources and of varying degrees of relevance to the problem at hand. All lie at the heart of interactions among passionate stakeholders. And most importantly, all ultimately require the integration of uncertain science and values in decision making, an enterprise to which quantitative assessment can contribute, but one that requires a broad and appropriate framework and process within which these contributions can be effectively made (NRC, 1996) .
Municipal Waste Combustors
Risk assessment performed in the context of municipal waste combustor permit applications illustrates the limitations of quantitative analysis as few other cases can (Cullen and Eschenroeder, 1997) . First it must be acknowledged that the management of waste in the US is not merely a practical or technical issue, since for many it encompasses ethical and moral considerations. The argument runs, "our society is overly consumptive and wasteful, and therefore generates far more garbage than is necessary." Indeed, opposition to waste combustion is often motivated as much by a desire to force pollution prevention and waste reduction as it is by local health and safety concerns, though these issues are combined with different emphases in different settings by national and local interests.
Waste management decisions raise clear issues of risk equity -the risks generated by management of the wastes from product production and use across a broad geographic area are often imposed upon a limited subset of those that benefit. Site selection, even if motivated by purely objective engineering cost considerations, can lead to the disproportionate selection of sites near poor or minority communities (US CEQ, 1971; UCC Commission for Racial Justice, 1987) . Certainly a broad spectrum of interested parties, from the regulated industry, to the public, to environmental groups, to all levels of government, vigorously debate waste management decisions. In the past this debate has often singled out municipal waste combustors (MWCs) for special attention.
In 1986 the US was home to 111 MWCs which incinerated 5-10% of the municipal solid waste stream nationally. Historically, as landfills have filled up and open space has dwindled, MWCs have been proposed as an alternative, carrying along the attractive possibility of supplementary power generation. As many as 200 communities had plans to build MWCs with start-up times in the mid-1990s. By 1995 only a small fraction of these facilities had been built. The rest were delayed or cancelled under heavy public opposition. Concern centered around health partly as a result of risk assessments; however the quantitative estimates were less important than the acknowledgement that a nonzero risk existed. These assessments explored MWC in isolation and therefore never served as a basis for national policy making or as a means for weighing a range of alternatives in a common framework. Thus it has been possible to block MWC sitings without ever considering the risks associated with alternative options such as landfilling (Cullen and Eschenroeder, 1997) . MWC sitings in the US have reached a virtual standstill. There is little evidence, however, that this has substantively contributed to pollution prevention or to any corresponding decrease in the rate of growth of municipal waste generation in the US (Worldwatch Institute, 2000) .
Recent History of MWC risk assessment
Since the early 1980s state and local governments have required health risk assessments for MWCs. The discovery by researchers in the Netherlands, Canada, Japan and Switzerland of dioxin in the ash released from MWCs raised public concern, since in toxicological experiments, dioxin acts as a potent carcinogen in animals, as well as being acutely toxic. Press coverage during the Agent Orange suit brought by Vietnam veterans and the evacuation of Times Beach, Missouri led to extreme notoriety for dioxin. Scientists at the Dow Chemical Company (Bumb et al., 1980) imputed fire as a general cause for dioxin formation. Subsequent research refined the inventory of sources of dioxin and identified MWCs as high-profile emitters. Given the potent carcinogenicity associated with dioxins and furans, quantitative risk calculations for MWCs are dominated by this family of compounds. Decades of research have been devoted to developing a better understanding of the mechanistic behavior of dioxin; however fundamental uncertainty still surrounds the vastly different responses observed in different species.
Approaches to assessing health risk from MWCs have evolved over time along with the field in general. Risk assessments have taken an increasingly comprehensive look at the contaminants released and the human receptors potentially exposed. For example, with better GC/MS techniques a more complete identification of the compounds present in stack gases has become possible. Also, routes of exposure to humans beyond inhalation, for example, ingestion of mother's milk and local foods, have been added. And rather than restricting consideration to hypothetical maximally exposed individuals, updated risk assessments identify multiple scenarios of exposure for potentially affected individuals and subpopulations using sophisticated models of contaminant fate and transport as well as information about the location of residences and workplaces. Despite the more extensive nature of these assessments over time, and the more inclusive set of health risks considered, estimates of individual risk have remained in the range of about 10 -5 to 10 -7 , with many results clustered around 10 -6 or one in one million (Levin et al, 1991) . There are at least two reasons why risk estimates have remained in the same quantitative range despite these changes. First, the estimates continue to be dominated by the risk attributable to dioxin exposure regardless of the inclusion of additional compounds. Second, a potential benefit of quantitative analysis is that facilities are now carefully designed to minimize the formation and release of dioxin in stack gases, so that emission levels have been significantly reduced.
From the mid-1980s until the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, the main toxic emissions of MWCs went largely unaddressed by the federal government. In 1984 EPA was charged by Congress with producing a report of national scope covering the current state of resource recovery facilities burning solid waste and the presence of dioxin in their emissions, any health risks posed by these emissions, and appropriate operating practices for controlling these emissions. In 1987 a nine volume report responding to these points was issued. The report focused on risk resulting from inhalation of dioxins and compared risk estimates between existing MWCs and those planned or proposed. This comparison showed significant decreases in potential health risks (as much as 90% overall) as a result of improvements in control technology for MWCs. This report provided a great deal of information about the state of the industry and the range and uncertainty of potential health risks. These results were later used to support regulation of MWCs under the Clean Air Act's new source performance standards (NSPSs) based on best demonstrated technology under Section 111, as opposed to a strict health basis under Section 112. In 1991 these NSPSs were introduced, but a suit brought by NRDC and the Sierra Club led to their replacement with standards based on maximum achievable control technology (MACT). MACT standards rely on the performance of the top 12% of operating facilities to set a floor for pollution control that must be equaled or exceeded by new technology. Looking back, it was public protest and outcry driven by MWC risk assessments that led to the introduction of the improved control technology upon which these are based. As a top ranked potential source category under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, MWCs will be the subject of a national assessment to gauge residual health risk in the coming years.
The Role and Limits of Quantitative Assessment
During the last 20 years or more community opposition has become close to 100% effective in blocking MWCs. Of the more than 200 MWCs proposed or planned in the mid-1980s only a handful have been built. Local governments require quantitative risk assessments on proposed MWCs; however comparative assessments of alternative disposal options, such as landfills, are largely lacking. Siting success appears to depend little on the quantitative estimates of risk reported during the application and permitting process, but rather the admission of nonzero risks for this particular option and the level of uncertainty and dread surrounding dioxin exposures. This result is consistent with the assertion that quantitative risk assessments are narrow and limited when viewed in the face of complex decisions involving community or individual values. This result is especially poignant given that the risks associated with landfill disposal are also non-zero and appear to be in the range of those associated with disposal by incineration (Cullen and Eschenroeder, 1997) . Is this outcome a reflection of the emergence of a de facto precautionary approach in the US? Are the potential risks from incineration more dreaded, less controllable, or less equitable than those from landfill disposal, or are we just averse to change in the type and nature of the risks that we face? To help assess these issues, it is interesting to compare the US experience to that of Europe, and in particular, France.
Municipal waste management in France is now in a similar situation to that faced by the US 20 years ago in terms of impending capacity problems, but with a different baseline of management infrastructure and a different set of resource restrictions. While waste management in France has, in recent years, been dominated by incineration, many of the 300 MWCs currently operating in France are out of date. Construction of more than 100 replacement MWCs is planned for the next 5-10 years (Boudet et al., 1999) . Detailed risk analyses are being carried out for the replacement units which emit 10 to 1000 fold lower concentrations of criteria pollutants in the stack gases than the original units. One of these units is the MWC in Grenoble (Boudet et al., 1999) . Not surprisingly expected levels of risk associated with a replacement facility are significantly lower than levels associated with the original facility, which is being used as a basis of comparison. Also interestingly, expected levels of dioxins and furans have not been established for the proposed facility in Grenoble due to limits in the analytic capability or capacity of local laboratories. Still, the levels of human exposure to dioxins and furans from this source are expected to be low relative to background exposures from dietary sources. It is notable that exposure and risk comparisons to both existing MWCs and background levels are being conducted and presented. Finally, severe limitations in available open space color the feasibility of landfilling in France, so a full exploration of other options for disposal (or reduction of waste generation) might not be expected in this case either. Thus, while it can be argued in the US that precautionary approaches favor the restriction of MWC options, a different set of baseline conditions and available resources appears to ensure that municipal waste combustion, and the quantitative risk assessments that inform their siting and performance, remain central to waste management strategy selection in France.
Climate Change
One of the most contentious science policy issues at present is the management of human induced climate change. The limitations of quantitative approaches are thrown into bold relief in this arena of analysis and decision making. In the past two decades major investments in the natural sciences have resulted in significant advances in our ability to identify trends and disruptions in climate patterns. Research aimed at establishing the extent of anthropogenic influence on the stability of the Earth's climate relies on the application of quantitative tools to a natural system fraught with variability, and an often unclear level of model uncertainty (Casman et al., 1999) . Recently, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), an international body which was spawned by the United Nations Environment Programme and the World Meteorological Organization in 1988 and charged with assessing the available scientific, technical and socioeconomic information concerning greenhouse-gas-induced climate change, has reported the emergence of a scientific consensus that anthropogenic climate change is real and observable, despite the uncertainties. And yet as pointed out by Morgan and Dowlatabadi (1996) , uncertainty surrounding value judgments about costs and benefits of alternatives to address climate change overshadows that about the science when it comes to decision making. Given our focus on assessing uncertain risk, we consider this example first from a relatively narrow viewpoint of hazard and risk assessment, and then return to a more holistic perspective.
Interactions of atmosphere and biosphere
All living things rely on the presence of a relatively consistent and limited range of climate conditions for survival, conditions mediated directly by the earth's atmosphere. While some species and some individuals within species can withstand a wider range of temperatures, altitudes and humidity than others, there is generally a preferred range sought out by any life form. Humans have survived in almost every location on the globe simply by heating or cooling their living space as necessary for comfort. But in general they avoid the locations with the most extreme conditions, as there are significant costs to maintaining livable conditions in these areas.
Many species migrate seasonally to remain in their preferred climatic conditions. Other species cycle through active and dormant states with the seasons and have evolved to rely on these cycles to thrive over many years. In the short term, changes in earth's atmosphere and climate can lead to the disruption of ecosystems, altering the patterns evolved by species for living, eating, and reproducing.
The similarity between the heat trapping ability of the glass panes of a greenhouse and the absorption of infrared by gases in Earth's atmosphere was first proposed by Fourier, a French mathematician and physicist, in 1827. Before the end of the 19 th century Swedish chemist Svante Arrhenius (eventually a Nobel prize winner in chemistry) predicted that the average temperature at the Earth's surface would rise by 4-6 degrees Celsius if atmospheric carbon dioxide levels doubled. The implications of this prediction did not receive much attention until about 1960 when CO 2 levels were observed to have risen to 315 parts per million (ppm), compared to a value of approximately 280 ppm in preindustrial times (IPCC, 1995) . CO 2 levels have now risen to approximately 365 ppm, a change attributed in part to the continued increase in fossil fuel burning to produce energy for human demands (IPCC, 1995) .
If one were to overlay a risk assessment framework on this system what might it look like? It is first necessary to define the adverse outcomes of concern and to understand their causes. Do these include a rise in CO 2 levels, subsequent changes in temperature, the ultimate impacts of temperature changes, such as loss of species, habitat, productivity of farmland, etc., or something beyond? Clearly the goal of such an exercise should not to be to impose a single, rigid framework of analysis, but rather to identify a full set of outcomes that people value, recognizing that the answers will depend upon the mix of stakeholders and decision makers included.
The IPCC synthesizes scientific information about climate change every five years and seeks to publish a consensus report. The last report was published in 1995 and at present a draft report for 2000 is undergoing a review process. This report applies an international perspective to the questions:
Have we detected climate change?
How much climate change can we expect under various assumptions about the emissions of greenhouse gases and about the emissions of CO 2 alone?
Climate change in this context refers to changes in the patterns of temperature and precipitation at the earth's surface around the globe. National assessments are carried out by each country as well as regional assessments, such as in the northwest of the US. These focus on potential risks to health, ecosystems, agricultural success, water storage, forestry, fisheries, recreation and power generation resulting from climate change.
Over the past 10 years three main areas of climate change research have been pursued: 1. Generating scenarios of greenhouse gas emissions in the past and future. Human economic activities and associated greenhouse gas emissions have been monitored with accuracy only for the past century, and in many parts of the world estimates are still quite approximate. Predicting future emissions is fraught with great uncertainty, due to unknown technological advances and possible structural changes in political and economic systems. Furthermore, these changes can interact with climate change in a synergistic or antagonistic manner. Changes in climate can cause:
• increased demand for energy use to maintain productivity, physical comfort and lifestyle advances; or • decreased demand through the adoption of more-energy efficient technology or lifestyles, and increased political support for treaties requiring emissions reduction in response to a growing, more apparent climate problem.
2. Assessments of trends in the climate record. At present scientists are on the edge of demonstrating the occurrence of climate change with statistical significance with the 100-year record of instrument data (leaving aside the paleo record). The record contains significant noise at low frequencies on the temporal scale. Successive years of the climate record are correlated, reducing the effective degrees of freedom afforded by climate data sets. Also, there is natural temporal variability such that apparent trends in the data could be the result of randomness. The question is, how do we separate the natural spectrum of climate variability from other trends and effects? Models for predicting climate change in response to greenhouse gas emissions play a critical role, both for assessing past trends and for predicting future outcomes. General atmospheric circulation models, now coupled with ocean and land-surface process models, can allow for historic reconstruction of recent climate, correcting for countervailing or compensatory effects, such as increases in atmospheric aerosol concentrations that have accompanied greenhouse gas emission and concentration trends. Research targeting climate variability, such as disruptions to the usual weather patterns, has also been pursued with great interest. A consideration of potential changes in the frequency of extreme events introduces additional variability and uncertainty into the analysis. In addition, these changes have important implications for the need for precautionary response to avoid the associated disruption and damage they bring (Bier et al., 1999) .
3. Measurement/Assessment of Impacts. Climate change is associated with a broad range of potential impacts to the Earth's geo-and biosphere. Assessments of effects such as sea-level rise, changes in plant productivity, species shifts in flora and fauna, and human health impacts, are constrained by data sets often quite limited in their spatial and temporal coverage. Models for these processes are highly uncertain, both in their parameter values and their structure -often even the selection of system boundaries for models is unclear. This selection is important since complex, nonlinear interactions and feedback mechanisms can occur among many different components of the Earth's environmental and human system. For example, changing land use patterns in the tropics, such as by deforestation, can lead to changes in global and local climate that affect both the viability of agriculture and the potential for the regrowth of forests in these regions.
With an extensive and still growing research effort, we have gone from an inability to show anthropogenic effects 10 years ago, to a near consensus that scientists are observing climate change now. Despite the difficulty of sorting out signal from noise in the variable state of atmosphere-ocean-land systems, the conclusion that humans have disrupted the usual patterns of climate variability has been embraced by the majority of the scientific community. This conclusion rests on evidence that CO 2 levels have risen and that global temperatures have risen in a corresponding manner, consistent with theory and models. But could this reflect natural variability rather than a real change? Proxy climate indicators suggest this is not the case, as the 20 th century global mean temperature is at least as warm as any other century since 1400 AD or earlier (Goldfarb, 2000) . Still, the assessment of the full range of effects from climate change, and the determination of the effect of different political and economic strategies on emissions growth and subsequent climate response, remain as uncertain as ever.
The Role and Limits of Quantitative Assessment
To date, despite a body of evidence and a cadre of scientists supporting the consensus that global climate change is real and anthropogenic, national governments seem reluctant to take steps to halt or reverse it. Complicating the situation is the fact that governments are in a position to make only some of the relevant decisions. At every level from individuals to communities to states and provinces, countless decisions are made daily that have enormous cumulative impacts on climate (Morgan and Dowlatabadi, 1996) . Furthermore, there is no international decision making body empowered to specify or enforce mitigative actions in response to IPCC findings.
There are many factors to consider in decision making beyond the quantitative assessment of the probability that the climate is changing, including the projected cost, inconvenience and disruption of taking actions to protect the stability of our planet's climate. Some would argue that inaction on the climate change issue is a result of a lack of scientific certainty. Indeed those working on global climate have openly acknowledged uncertainty in their estimates of particular climate indicators, such as the magnitude of projected temperature changes. This recognition is apparent in recent IPCC reports, and has been necessary for obtaining consensus among the many scientists participating in the IPCC process. A related aspect of the problem may be that the lack of interlinked systems, which allow decision makers to access both detailed local scale assessment information and existing global scale information systems, is only beginning to be recognized and explored (Cash, 2000) .
Another argument against action is based on the projected expense of changing behavior and practices that lead to emissions of CO 2 in the generation of energy. The assumption that a net social loss would occur with a major change in energy use rests on further assumptions about the balance between the inevitable winners and losers of such a shift. Those espousing a precautionary principle might choose to focus on such characteristic decision features as the potential for irreversible changes and the distribution of impacts between and across species when deciding whether to act to slow or halt climate change. In this example it is interesting to consider how much and what type of scientific information (if any) would change opinions and preferences? All of the features challenge the adequacy of a strictly quantitative framework for illuminating the best decisions for the diverse populations and species sharing the planet.
Risk of Species Extinction
The final example concerns the application of a quantitative risk approach to ecosystem and species health explicitly. Under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) government agencies are responsible for evaluating the long-term viability of individual species in order to decide whether they warrant "listing" as critical or endangered. The goal of the ESA is to ensure that species are viable over the long term. The long-term survival of species is defined for this purpose by a 100-year period, consistent with extinction risk time frames for other species. The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) is charged with these duties for marine species such as salmon. As described below, each salmon species encompasses multiple populations of fish, each with characteristic behaviors and all prized throughout history for symbolic and practical reasons. In 1999 Washington State's Puget Sound Chinook salmon were listed under the ESA. In addition to the role discussed above, NMFS must participate, along with other groups, in the development of recovery plans for listed species to ensure that they will return to a viable status. Puget Sound Chinook are the focus of a NMFS Recovery Team study beginning in April 2000, tasked with identifying the measures necessary to bring the species back to health.
An interdisciplinary group of scientists convened by NMFS is currently tackling a pivotal step in this process, the establishment of the minimum number of individuals that constitutes a viable population. A salmon "species", the target of protection in this case, is considered to consist of an "evolutionarily significant unit" (ESU) made up of one or more populations of reproductively isolated salmon, which spawn in a specific location and season without significant exchange with other populations. The viable population varies with characteristics described below. Yet this number serves an important role as it becomes an indicator for decision-making under the Endangered Species Act and also for assessing the impact of development or operations near crucial habitat for listed species.
Recently NMFS developed a detailed framework for identifying the biological requirements of viable populations of salmon. In this framework the agency establishes four population parameters relating to viability (McElhany et al., 2000) :
1. Abundance -possessing an adequate number of members; 2. Productivity -producing sufficient offspring per parent; 3. Diversity -representing adequate genetic, morphological, and life-history diversity; and 4. Spatial Structure -distributing individuals at a density and in a manner that promotes species health.
A combination of quantitative and qualitative information is used to estimate the minimum viable population in light of these four parameters. As a result of severe limits in available data, in some cases the population requirements rely heavily on models describing the life cycle and robustness of salmon. Competing models lie at the heart of disputes about such habitat altering developments as hydropower generating dams. Models have been developed by university researchers (e.g., the School of Fisheries at University of Washington), government agency scientists (e.g., the Cumulative Risk Initiative (CRI) group at NMFS) and others. Some of the models rest on the assumption that simple proportions may adequately describe the rate of survival of fish faced with a barrier such as a dam, as they head to their spawning waters. Others use complex systems of equations to describe multiple life cycles and interactions in predicting survival under habitat challenges.
The absence of adequate quantitative information for determining the four critical population parameters leaves the agency in a position to discuss each in qualitative terms. Still the number of fish constituting a viable population with respect to these parameters must be estimated for each population, and also in light of the characteristics of the overall ESU. This process is complicated in that the right number can never be known with certainty, and there is a small but finite probability of species extinction even with relatively large populations. In the face of this uncertainty, NMFS must estimate a minimum number of fish that will ensure viability while acknowledging that there is a small residual risk of extinction.
The Role and Limits of Quantitative Assessment
Implicit in the establishment of a viable population magnitude for salmonids is a decision about the magnitude of acceptable extinction risk. A working assumption is that a 5% risk of extinction within 100 years should correspond to the viable population estimate. This assumption lies at the margin between scientific assessment and risk management decision making. The development of a distribution reflecting uncertainty in the magnitude of the extinction risk versus population size would also present many challenges, but it would enable the decisions about the acceptable risk of extinction to be shifted from the shoulders of the scientists to those of policy makers. How should acceptable risk be established in this case? Is it more appropriately dictated by the values of society or is it a purely scientific issue based on the history of species robustness in the face of challenge? This question will be the subject of public debate and discussion in the Northwest as the estimation of minimum viable populations continues beyond initial studies in April of 2000, led by the science based Recovery Team for Puget Sound Chinook Salmon.
Summary of Examples
The limits of quantitative analysis are illustrated in the context of all three examples presented above. In these examples uncertain risk to variable natural systems eludes definitive quantitative treatment. Profound knowledge gaps limit the role of quantitative analysis. Conflicts in values cloud the interpretation of quantitative results. Quantitative treatments across alternatives are not consistent. Decisions about risk acceptability fall both within and outside of the role of participating scientists.
Human health risk resulting from the operation of municipal waste combustors encompasses the smallest scale and possibly the best understood source of the three, though even here the health effects from the low exposure concentrations associated with MWCs remain highly uncertain. At the opposite extreme, risk to the stability of earth's climate is arguably the least understood in terms of the complexity of the interactions between sources of hazard and receptor systems, and possible nonlinear or irreversible outcomes. Between these two lies the risk of species extinction with its dearth of relevant and applicable information.
In the case of municipal waste combustors quantitative estimates of health risk, however uncertain, have in many locations (especially in the US) become quite incidental to decisions about acceptability and siting. A risk estimate of any magnitude exceeds the zero risk assumed for the other options. This combined with the public reaction to dioxin sources of any description makes the decision about acceptability simple in the eyes of many, perhaps too much so. Meanwhile, concerns about distributional inequity in potential human impacts of MWCs are not compared with potential inequities associated with other forms of waste disposal. In the case of endangered salmonids, a science team has been put in the position of choosing an acceptable risk of extinction so that they can carry out their mandate to establish a minimum viable population size. The assessment struggles with profound uncertainty about the response of the populations to habitat interventions, but at its heart, the selection of an acceptable risk dictates the number of fish that will be defined as viable. Finally, in the case of climate change, a range of decision makers have been left to draw their own conclusions about the acceptability of the apparent risk to the planet of business as usual. These individuals and groups will make decisions that will be influenced by climate, economic, political and social outcomes, and perhaps even quantitative assessments of risk in a manner that is as uncertain as the risks themselves (Clark and Dickson, 1999) . Much research is still needed to improve methods for quantitative risk and uncertainty analysis, and to better understand its evolving contribution to individual, organizational and societal decision making.
